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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate joint relay and jammer selection in two-way cooperative networks,
consisting of two sources, a number of intermediate nodes, and one eavesdropper, with the constraints
of physical layer security. Specifically, the proposed algorithms select two or three intermediate
nodes to enhance security against the malicious eavesdropper. The first selected node operates
in the conventional relay mode and assists the sources to deliver their data to the corresponding
destinations using an amplify-and-forward protocol. The second and third nodes are used in different
communication phases as jammers in order to create intentional interference upon the eavesdropper
node. Firstly, we find that in a topology where the intermediate nodes are randomly and sparsely
distributed, the proposed schemes with cooperative jamming outperform the conventional non-
jamming schemes within a certain transmitted power regime. We also find that, in the scenario in
which the intermediate nodes gather as a close cluster, the jamming schemes may be less effective
than their non-jamming counterparts. Therefore, we introduce a hybrid scheme to switch between
jamming and non-jamming modes. Simulation results validate our theoretical analysis and show
that the hybrid switching scheme further improves the secrecy rate.
This work is partially supported by US NSF CNS-0910401, CNS-0905556, and CNS-0953377.
2I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally security in wireless networks has been mainly focused on higher layers using
cryptographic methods [1]. Pioneered by Aaron Wyner’s work [2], which introduced the wire-
tap channel and established fundamental results of creating perfectly secure communications
without relying on private keys, physical-layer-based security has drawn increasing attention
recently. The basic idea of physical layer security is to exploit the physical characteristics
of the wireless channel to provide secure communications. The security is quantified by the
secrecy capacity, which is defined as the maximum rate of reliable information sent from
the source to the intended destination in the presence of eavesdroppers. Wyner showed that
when the eavesdropper channel is a degraded version of the main channel, the source and
the destination can exchange secure messages at a non-zero rate. The following research
work [3] studied the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel, and [4] extended
Wyner’s approach to the transmission of confidential messages over the broadcast channels.
Very recently, physical layer security have been generalized to investigate wireless fading
channels [5]–[8], and various multiple access scenarios [9]–[12].
Note the fact that if the source-wiretapper channel is stronger than the source-destination
channel, the perfect secrecy rate will be zero [4]. Some work [13]–[24] has been proposed
to overcome this limitation with the help of relay cooperation by cooperative relaying [13]–
[14], and cooperative jamming [15]–[17]. For instance, in [13] and [14], the authors proposed
effective decode-and-forward (DF) and amplify-and-forward (AF) based cooperative relaying
protocols for physical layer security, respectively. Cooperative jamming is another approach
to improve the secrecy rate by interfering the eavesdropper with codewords independent of the
source messages. In Yener and Tekin’s work [15], a scheme termed collaborative secrecy was
proposed, in which a non-transmitting user was selected to help increase the secrecy capacity
for a transmitting user by effectively “jamming” the eavesdropper. Following similar idea as
[15], they first proposed cooperative jamming in [16] and [17] in order to increase achievable
rates in the scenarios where general gaussian multiple access wire-tap channel and two-way
wire-tap channel were assumed, respectively. The authors of [18] and [19] investigated the
effects of user cooperation on the secrecy of broadcast channels by considering a cooperative
relay broadcast channel, and showed that user cooperation can increase the achievable secrecy
region. The study of communicating through unauthenticated intermediate relays between a
source-destination pair started from Yenner and He’s work [20]–[22]. The relay channel with
3confidential messages was also investigated in [23]–[24], where the untrusted relay node acts
both as an eavesdropper and a conventional assistant relay.
Two-way communication is a common scenario in which two nodes transmit information
to each other simultaneously. Recently, the two-way relay channel [25]–[29] has attracted lots
of interest from both academic and industrial communities due to its bandwidth efficiency and
potential application to cellular networks and peer-to-peer networks. In [25] and [26], both AF
and DF protocols for one-way relay channels were extended to general full-duplex discrete
two-way relay channel and half-duplex Gaussian two-way relay channel, respectively. In [27],
network and channel coding were used in two-way relay channel to increase the sum-rate of
two sources. The work in [28] introduced a two-way memoryless system with relays in which
the signal transmitted by the relay was obtained by applying an instantaneous relay function
to the previously received signal in order to optimize the symbol error rate performance. As
for the secure communications, in [29], Yener and He investigated the role of feedback in
secrecy for two-way networks, and proved that the loss in secrecy rate when ignoring the
feedback is very limited in a scenario with half-duplex Gaussian two-way relay channels and
an eavesdropper.
It is well known that, in a cooperative communication network, proper relay/jammer
selection can have a significant impact on the performance of the whole system. Several
relay selection techniques [30]–[32] have been explored by far. The authors in [30] proposed
a non-jamming relay selection scheme for two-way networks with multiple AF relays in
an environment without eavesdroppers, which maximized the worse received signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) of the two end users. In [31], several relay selection techniques were proposed
in one-way cooperative networks with secrecy constraints. In [32], the authors investigated
some relay selection techniques in a two-hop DF cooperative communication system with
no central processing unit to optimally select the relay. Although cooperative networks have
received much attention by far, the physical layer security issues with secrecy constraints in
two-way schemes have not yet been well investigated.
To this end, in this paper, we propose a scheme that can implement information exchange
in the physical layer against eavesdroppers for two-way cooperative networks, consisting of
two sources, a number of intermediate nodes, and one eavesdropper, with the constraints for
physical layer security. Unlike [30], in which the relay selection is operated in an environment
with no security requirement, our work takes into account the secrecy constraints. In contrast
to [31], where many relay selections based on the DF strategy for one-way cooperative
4wireless networks were proposed and a safe broadcast phase was assumed, the problem we
consider here involves a non-security broadcast phase, and the information is transferred
bidirectionally.
Specifically, a node is selected from an intermediate node set to operate at a conventional
relay mode, and then uses an AF strategy in order to assist the sources to deliver data to
the corresponding destination. Meanwhile, another two intermediate nodes that perform as
jammers are selected to transmit artificial interference in order to degrade the eavesdropper
links in the first and second phases of signal transmissions, respectively. We assume that both
destinations cannot mitigate artificial interference, and thus, the jamming will also degrade
the desired information channels. The principal question here is how to select the relay and
the jamming nodes in order to increase information security, and meanwhile protect the
source message against eavesdroppers. Several selection algorithms are proposed, aiming at
promoting the assistance to the sources as well as the interference to the eavesdropper.
The theoretical analysis and simulation results reveal that the proposed jamming schemes
can improve the secrecy rate of the system by a large scale, but only within a certain
transmitted power range. In some particular scenarios, the proposed schemes become less
efficient than the conventional ones. We then propose a hybrid scheme with an intelligent
switching mechanism between jamming and non-jamming modes to solve this problem.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the system
model, and formulate the problem under consideration. Section III presents the proposed
selection techniques, and introduces their hybrid implementations. In Section IV, we provide
both quantitative analysis and qualitative discussions of different selection schemes in some
typical configurations. Numerical results are shown in Section V, and in Section VI, we draw
the main conclusions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
We assume a network configuration consisting of two sources S1 and S2, one eavesdropper
E, and an intermediate node set Sin = {1, 2, ..., K} with K nodes. In Fig. 1 it schematically
shows the system model. As the intermediate nodes cannot transmit and receive simulta-
neously (half duplex constraint), the communication process is performed into two phases.
During the broadcasting phase, S1 and S2 transmit their data to the intermediate nodes. In
addition, according to the security protocol, one node J1 is selected from Sin to operate as
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Fig. 1. System model, where the eavesdropper node is able to receive signals from both S1 and S2.
a “jammer” and transmit intentional interference to degrade the eavesdropper links in this
phase. Since the jamming signal is unknown at the rest nodes of Sin, the interference will also
degrade the performance of the relay links, as shown in Fig. 1. In the second phase, according
to the security protocol, an intermediate node R is selected to operate as a conventional relay
and forwards the source messages to the corresponding destinations. A second jammer J2 is
selected from Sin, for the same reason as that for J1. Note that the destinations S1 and S2
are not able to mitigate the artificial interference from the jamming node, either.
In both two phases, a slow, flat, and block Rayleigh fading environment is assumed, i.e.,
the channel remains static for one coherence interval and changes independently in different
coherence intervals with a variance σ2i,j = d
−β
i,j , where di,j denotes the Euclidean distance
between node i and node j, and β represents the path-loss exponent. The channel between
node i and node j is denoted as hi,j , which is modeled as a zero-mean, independent, circularly-
symmetric complex Gaussian random variable with variance σ2i,j . Furthermore, additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) with zero mean and unit variance is assumed. Let PS , PR and
PJ denote the transmitted power for the source nodes, the relay node and the jamming
nodes, respectively. In order to protect the destinations from severe artificial interference,
the jamming nodes transmit with a lower power than the relay nodes [31], and thus their
6transmitted power can be defined as PJ = PR/L, where L ≫ 1 denotes the power ratio of
the relay to the jammer.
In the first phase, the two sources send information symbols s1 and s2, respectively, which
are mapped to a PSK set. The intermediate node R and eavesdropper E thus receive
r =
√
PShS1,Rs1 +
√
PShS2,Rs2 +
√
PJhJ1,Rj1 + vR, (1)
e1 =
√
PShS1,Es1 +
√
PShS2,Es2 +
√
PJhJ1,Ej1 + vE , (2)
where vR and vE denote the noise at R and E, respectively.
In the second phase, the node R is selected to amplify its received signal and forward it
to S1 and S2, i.e., R broadcasts
t = α
√
PRr, (3)
where α =
√
1
1+|hS1,R|
2PS+|hS2,R|2PS+|hJ1,R|
2PJ
.
Since the destination Si knows si (for i = 1, 2), it can cancel the self-interference.
Therefore, S1, S2, and the eavesdropper E get
x1 = α
√
PR
√
PShS2,RhR,S1s2 + α
√
PR
√
PJhJ1,RhR,S1j1
+
√
PJhJ2,S1j2 + α
√
PRhR,S1vR + w1, (4)
x2 = α
√
PR
√
PShS1,RhR,S2s1 + α
√
PR
√
PJhJ1,RhR,S2j1
+
√
PJhJ2,S2j2 + α
√
PRhR,S2vR + w2, (5)
e2 = α
√
PR
√
PS (hS1,Rs1 + hS2,Rs2)hR,E + α
√
PRhR,EvR
+ α
√
PR
√
PJhJ1,RhR,Ej1 +
√
PJhJ2,Ej2 + wE, (6)
where w1,w2, and wE represent the noise terms at S1, S2, and E, respectively. Then, Γj ,
defined as the overall signal to interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of the channel Si → Sj
(for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j), can be calculated as
Γj =
γSi,Sj
γJ1,Sj + γJ2,Sj + γR,Sj + 1
, (7)
where γm,n represents the instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) for the link m→ n:
γSi,Sj = α
2PRPS|hSi,R|2|hR,Sj |2, (8)
γJ1,Sj = α
2PRPJ |hJ1,R|2|hR,Sj |2, (9)
γJ2,Sj = PJ |hJ2,Sj |2, (10)
γR,Sj = α
2PR|hR,Sj |2. (11)
7Strictly speaking, in order to maximize the overall SINR of the eavesdropping links, the
eavesdropper (E) can perform whatever operations as it wishes with the signals received in
the previous two phases. Here in this paper, we take a simple case in which the eavesdropper
applies maximal ratio combining (MRC) [34], so as to examine the efficiency of the proposed
jamming schemes 1. According to MRC, E combines the received signals by multiplying e1
in (2) and e2 in (6) with proper weighting factors a1 and a2, respectively. Without loss of
generality, consider the scenario in which E intends to optimize the SINR of eavesdropper
link Si → E, for i = 1, 2, the combined eavesdropping signal can be written as
ei = ai1e1 + a
i
2e2, (12)
where
ai1
∆
=
√
PSh
H
Si,E
σ2Ne1 ,Sj
, (13)
ai2
∆
=
α
√
PSh
H
Si,R
hHR,E
σ2Ne2 ,Sj
, (14)
with i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, and (·)H is the conjugate transpose. σ2Ne1 ,Sj and σ2Ne2 ,Sj represent the
total interference and noise power terms in e1 and e2, respectively:
σ2Ne1 ,Sj = γSj ,E + γJ1,E + 1, (15)
σ2Ne2 ,Sj = γSj ,R,E + γJ1,R,E + γJ2,E + γR,E + 1, (16)
where
γSj ,E = PS|hSj ,E |2, (17)
γJj ,E = PJ |hJj ,E|2, (18)
γSj ,R,E = α
2PRPS|hSj ,R|2|hR,E|2, (19)
γJ1,R,E = α
2PRPJ |hJ1,R|2|hR,E |2, (20)
γR,E = α
2PR|hR,E |2. (21)
In order to calculate the SINR of link Si → E, we assume two different channel knowledge
sets:
1Please note that the eavesdropper’s operation is not limited to maximal ratio combining (MRC). And the increasing in
secrecy rates of the proposed schemes can still be achieved if the eavesdropper takes other operations, since the basic forms
of the SINRs and thus of the secrecy rates do not change.
81) ψ0 that denotes a global instantaneous knowledge for all the links,
2) ψ1 that denotes an average channel knowledge for the eavesdropper links.
With the assumption of ψ0, we can get the instantaneous SNR of any channel i → j in
the system. Thus, the SINR of link Si → E can be calculated as
ΓEi =
PS|hSi,E|2
σ2Ne1 ,Sj
+
α2PRPS|hSi,R|2|hR,E |2
σ2Ne2 ,Sj
=
γSi,E
γSj ,E + γJ1,E + 1
+
γSi,R,E
γSj ,R,E + γJ1,R,E + γJ2,E + γR,E + 1
,
s.t. ψ0. (22)
In an environment where the instantaneous channel knowledge set ψ0 is not available, we
can use the expectation of SNRs for the eavesdropper links E [γSi,E], which is provided by
the average channel knowledge ψ1 , to get the SINRs:
Γ′Ei =
E [γSi,E]
E
[
γSj ,E
]
+ E [γJ1,E] + 1
+
E
[
γSj ,R,E
]
E
[
γSj ,R,E
]
+ E [γJ1,R,E] + E [γJ2,E] + E [γR,E] + 1
,
s.t. ψ1, (23)
where E [·] stands for the expectation operator.
B. Problem Formulation
The instantaneous secrecy rate for the node set Sin for source Si can be expressed [35]
RSi (R, J1, J2) =
[
1
2
log2 (1 + Γi)−
1
2
log2
(
1 + ΓEj
)]+
, (24)
where i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, and [x]+ ∆= max {0, x}.
The overall secrecy performance of the system is characterized by the ergodic secrecy
capacity that is the expectation of the sum of the two sources’ secrecy rates, E [RS (R, J1, J2)],
where
RS (R, J1, J2) = RS1 (R, J1, J2) +RS2 (R, J1, J2) . (25)
Our objective is to select appropriate nodes R, J1, and J2 in order to maximize the
instantaneous secrecy rate subject to different types of channel feedback. The optimization
problem can be formulated as
(R∗, J∗1 , J
∗
2 ) = argmax
R,J1,J2∈Sin
R6=J1,J2
RS (R, J1, J2) ,
s.t. ψu, (26)
9where u = 0, 1; R∗, J∗1 and J∗2 denote the selected relay and jamming nodes, respectively.
Note that here the selected jammers J∗1 and J∗2 in the two phases may be the same node,
which is determined by the instantaneous secrecy rate.
C. Selection without Jamming
In a conventional cooperative network, the relay scheme does not have the help from
jamming nodes. We derive the following solutions under this scenario.
1) Conventional Selection (CS): The conventional selection does not take the eavesdropper
channels into account, and the relay node is selected according to the instantaneous SNR of
the links between node S1 and node S2 only. Therefore, the SINR given in (7) becomes
ΓCSj =
γSi,Sj
γR,Sj + 1
, (27)
where ΓCSj represents the SINR of the channel Si → Sj (for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j) without
considering the eavesdropper.
Hence, the conventional selection algorithm can be expressed as
R∗ = arg max
R∈Sin
{RS1 (R) +RS2 (R)}
= arg max
R∈Sin
{
1
2
log2
(
1 + ΓCS1
)
+
1
2
log2
(
1 + ΓCS2
)}
= arg max
R∈Sin
{(
1 +
γS1,S2
γR,S2 + 1
)
·
(
1 +
γS2,S1
γR,S1 + 1
)}
, (28)
with γSi,Sj and γR,Sj for (i, j = 0, 1) given by (8) and (11), respectively. Since (28) shows that
this selection does not consider the eavesdropping links, the CS algorithm may not able to
support systems with the secrecy constraints even though it may effective in non-eavesdropper
environments.
2) Optimal Selection (OS): This solution takes the eavesdropper into account and selects
the relay node based on ψ0, which provides the instantaneous channel knowledge for all the
links. Then, the SINR of link Si → E in (22) can be rewritten as
ΓOSEi =
γSi,E
γSj ,E + 1
+
γSi,R,E
γSj ,R,E + γR,E + 1
. (29)
The optimal selection is given as:
R∗ = arg max
R∈Sin
{RS1 (R) +RS2 (R)}
= arg max
R∈Sin
{
1
2
log2
(
1 + ΓOS1
)− 1
2
log2
(
1 + ΓOSE2
)
+
1
2
log2
(
1 + ΓOS2
)− 1
2
log2
(
1 + ΓOSE1
)}
= arg max
R∈Sin
{
1 + ΓOS1
1 + ΓOSE2
· 1 + Γ
OS
2
1 + ΓOSE1
}
, (30)
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where
ΓOSi = Γ
CS
i =
γSj ,Si
γR,Si + 1
. (31)
3) Suboptimal Selection (SS): The suboptimal selection implements the relay selection
based on the knowledge set ψ1, which gives the average estimate of the eavesdropper links.
Therefore, it avoids the difficulty of getting instantaneous estimate of the channel feedbacks.
Similar to the OS algorithm in (30), the suboptimal selection can be written as
R∗ = arg max
R∈Sin
{
1 + ΓSS1
1 + ΓSSE2
· 1 + Γ
SS
2
1 + ΓSSE1
}
, (32)
where
ΓSSi = Γ
OS
i =
γSj ,Si
γR,Si + 1
, (33)
ΓSSEi =
E [γSi,E ]
E
[
γSj ,E
]
+ 1
+
E [γSi,R,E]
E
[
γSj ,R,E
]
+ E [γR,E ] + 1
. (34)
Note that in comparison of the OS in (30), the only difference of the SS algorithm in (32)
is that it requires the average channel state information, ψ1, which would be more useful in
practice.
III. SELECTIONS WITH JAMMING IN TWO-WAY RELAY SYSTEMS
In this section, we present several node selection techniques based on the optimization
problem given by (26) in the two-way systems. Unlike [31], where the selection techniques
only concern about the secrecy performance in the second phase of transmission, here, our
work takes into account both the two phases in order to select a set of relay and jammers
that can maximize the overall expectation of secrecy rate.
A. Optimal Selection with Maximum Sum Instantaneous Secrecy Rate (OS-MSISR)
The optimal selection with maximum sum instantaneous secrecy rate assumes a knowledge
set ψ0 and ensures a maximization of the sum of instantaneous secrecy rates of node S1 and
node S2 given in (25), which gives credit to
(R∗, J1
∗, J2
∗) = argmax
R,J1,J2∈Sin
R6=J1,J2
{RS(R, J1, J2)}
= argmax
R,J1,J2∈Sin
R6=J1,J2
{
1 + Γ2
1 + ΓE1
· 1 + Γ1
1 + ΓE2
}
, (35)
where Γi and ΓEi are given by (7) and (22), respectively.
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The approach in (35) reflects the basic idea of using both cooperative relaying and co-
operative jamming in order to promote the system’s secrecy performance. Specifically, the
OS-MSISR scheme here tends to select a set of relay and jammers that maximizes Γi, which
means promoting the assistance to the sources. Meanwhile this relay and jammer set tends
to minimize ΓEi , which is equivalent to enhance the interference to the eavesdropper.
Although the OS-MSISR scheme seems to be a straightforward application for cooperative
relaying and cooperative jamming, the actual selection procedure usually involves trade-
offs. For instance, according to (7) and (9), we should select the relay and jammer set that
minimizes |hJ1,R| in order to make Γi as high as possible. Considering (19), (20) and (22),
however, the lower |hJ1,R| is, the higher ΓEi is, which is undesirable. Thus, we have to make
a trade-off between raising Γi and inhibiting ΓEi in order to optimize the right part of (35).
B. Optimal Selection with Max-Min Instantaneous Secrecy Rate (OS-MMISR)
It is obvious that the OS-MSISR in (35) is complicated, in this subsection we propose a
reduced-complexity algorithm. It is common that the sum secrecy rate of two sources, i.e.
RS1 (R, J1, J2)+RS2 (R, J1, J2), may be driven down to a low level by the user with the lower
secrecy rate. As a result, for low complexity, the intermediate nodes, which maximize the
minimum secrecy rate of two users, can be selected to achieve the near-optimal performance.
In addition, in some scenarios, the considered secrecy performance does not only take into
account the total secrecy rate of all the source nodes, but also the individual secrecy rate of
each node. If one source node has low secrecy rate, the whole system is regarded as secrecy
inefficient. Furthermore, assuring each individual source node a high secrecy rate is another
perspective of increasing the whole system’s secrecy performance.
The OS-MMISR selection maximizes the worse instantaneous secrecy rate of the two
source nodes with the assumption of knowledge set ψ0, and we can get
(R∗, J1
∗, J2
∗) = argmaxmin
R,J1,J2∈Sin
R6=J1,J2
{RS1(R, J1, J2), RS2(R, J1, J2)}
= argmaxmin
R,J1,J2∈Sin
R6=J1,J2
{
1 + Γ2
1 + ΓE1
,
1 + Γ1
1 + ΓE2
}
, (36)
where Γi and ΓEi are given by (7) and (22), respectively.
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C. Optimal Switching (OSW)
The original idea of using jamming nodes is to introduce interference on the eavesdropper
links. However, there are two side-effects of using jamming. Firstly, the jamming node in
the second phase J2 poses undesired interference directly onto the destinations. Secondly,
it degrades the links between the relay node R and the destinations. Given the assumption
that the destinations cannot mitigate this artificial interference, continuous jamming in both
phases is not always beneficial for the whole system. In some specific situation (e.g., J2 is
close to one destination), the continuous jamming may decrease secrecy rate seriously, and
act as a bottleneck for the system. In order to overcome this problem, we introduce the idea
of intelligent switching between the OS-MSISR and the OS scheme in order to reduce the
impact of “negative interference”. The threshold for the involvement of the jammer nodes is
RS1 (R, J1, J2) +RS2 (R, J1, J2) > R
OS
S1
(R) +ROSS2 (R) , (37)
where
ROSSi (R) =
[
1
2
log2
(
1 + ΓOSi
1 + ΓOSEj
)]+
. (38)
Thus, (37) can be further written as
1 + Γ1
1 + ΓE2
· 1 + Γ2
1 + ΓE1
>
1 + ΓOS1
1 + ΓOSE2
· 1 + Γ
OS
2
1 + ΓOSE1
, (39)
where Γi, ΓEi , ΓOSi and ΓOSEi are given by (7) and (22), (31) and (29), respectively.
For each time slot, if (39) is met, the OS-MSISR scheme provides higher instantaneous
secrecy rate than OS does and is preferred. Otherwise the OS scheme is more efficient
in promoting the system’s secrecy performance, which should be employed. Because of the
uncertainty of the channel coefficient hi,j for each channel i→ j, the OSW should outperform
either the continuous jamming scheme or the non-jamming one.
D. Suboptimal Selection with Maximum Sum Instantaneous Secrecy Rate (SS-MSISR)
With the assumption of ψ0, we can get some optimal selection metrics. However, its
practical interest and potential implements are only limited to some special (e.g. military)
applications, where the instantaneous quality of the eavesdropper links can be measured by
some specific protocols. In practice, only an average knowledge of these links ψ1 would be
available from long term eavesdropper supervision. The selection metrics is modified as
13
(R∗, J1
∗, J2
∗) = argmax
R,J1,J2∈Sin
R6=J1,J2
{
1 + Γ2
1 + Γ′E1
· 1 + Γ1
1 + Γ′E2
}
, (40)
where Γi and Γ′Ei are given by (7) and (23), respectively.
From (40), we can predict that for a scenario in which the intermediate nodes are sparsely
distributed across the considered area, the SS-MSISR scheme can provide similar relay and
jammer selection with the OS-MSISR scheme. This is because a slightly difference between
E [γi,E] provided by ψ1 and γi,E provided by ψ0 would not be enough for the scheme to select
another far-away intermediate node. Thus, under this condition, the average eavesdropper
channel knowledge set ψ1 may contain sufficient channel information as well for a quasi-
optimal selection.
E. Suboptimal Selection with Max-Min Instantaneous Secrecy Rate (SS-MMISR)
This scheme refers to the practical application of the above selection with maximum worse
instantaneous secrecy rate in (36). The basic idea of considering ψ1 as the average behavior
of eavesdropper links is the same as SS-MSISR, but aimed at looking for the maximum
worse instantaneous secrecy rate, which is written as
(R∗, J1
∗, J2
∗) = argmaxmin
R,J1,J2∈Sin
R6=J1,J2
{RS1(R, J1, J2), RS2(R, J1, J2)}
= argmaxmin
R,J1,J2∈Sin
R6=J1,J2
{
1 + Γ2
1 + Γ′E1
,
1 + Γ1
1 + Γ′E2
}
, (41)
where Γi and Γ′Ei are given by (7) and (23), respectively.
F. Suboptimal Switching (SSW)
Given the fact that jamming is not always a positive process for the performance of
the system, the suboptimal switching refers to the practical application of the intelligent
switching between the SS-MSISR and the SS schemes. The basic idea is the same as OSW,
but the switching criterion uses the available knowledge set ψ1. More specifically, the required
condition for switching from SS-MSISR to SS mode is
1 + Γ1
1 + Γ′E2
· 1 + Γ2
1 + Γ′E1
>
1 + ΓSS1
1 + ΓSSE2
· 1 + Γ
SS
2
1 + ΓSSE1
, (42)
where Γi, Γ′Ei , Γ
SS
i and ΓSSEi are given by (7) and (23), (33) and (34), respectively.
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G. Optimal Selection with “Known” Jamming (OSKJ)
The previous selection techniques are proposed based on the assumption that the jamming
signal is unknown at both the two destinations. This assumption avoids the initialization
period in which the jamming sequence is defined, and thus, it reduces the risk of giving out
the artificial interference to the eavesdropper. For comparison reasons, here we propose a
“control” scheme, in which the jamming signal can be decoded at the destinations S1 and
S2, but not at the eavesdropper E. In this case, the SINR of the link from Si (for i = 1, 2)
to E remains the same as ΓEi given by (22). The SINR of the link from Si to Sj (for
i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j) is modified as follows:
Γi =
γSj,Si
γR,Si + 1
. (43)
The OSKJ scheme is taken into consideration in the numerical results section as a reference.
This, however, is not the “ideal” jamming scheme since the artificial interference from the
jammers only degrades the eavesdropper links. As we have discovered and will discuss in
Section V, in some particular scenarios, the OSKJ scheme is outperformed by the OSW and
SSW schemes presented above, for the jamming has changed the value of α given in (3).
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we firstly do some quantitative analysis on the asymptotic performance
of both the proposed jamming and non-jamming schemes in high transmitted power range.
Then, we provide a qualitative discussion of the secrecy performance of different selection
schemes in some typical scenarios based on the system model in Section II.
A. Asymptotic Performance for Selections without Jamming
Without loss of generality, we take the OS scheme for example. With high transmitted
power PS , we can get
ΓOSi → PS|hSi,R|2, (44)
ΓOSEi →
|hSi,E |2
|hSj ,E |2
+
|hSi,R|2
|hSj ,R|2
. (45)
We can see that ΓOSi grows rapidly as PS increases, while ΓOSEi converges to a value that
depends only on the relative distances between the sources, the eavesdropper and the relay.
Therefore, the ergodic secrecy capacity E [RS] also increases rapidly with the transmitted
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power PS. Based on (44) and (45), the slope of the curve of E [RS] versus PS (measured by
dB) can be approximately calculated as
∂E [RS1 +RS2 ]
∂PS
=
∂E
[
1
2
log2
10PS/10|hS1,R|
2·10PS/10|hS2,R|
2
ΓOSE1 ·Γ
OS
E2
]
∂PS
=
∂E
[
1
2
log2 10
2PS/10
]
∂PS
+
∂E
[
1
2
log2
|hS1,R|
2|hS2,R|
2
ΓOSE1 ·Γ
OS
E2
]
∂PS
=
∂
(
PS
10
log2 10
)
∂PS
=
1
10
log2 10
≈ 0.3322 (46)
For the other non-jamming schemes (i.e. CS, SS), we note that they share the same
asymptotic performance as the OS scheme with a linear increment of slope about 0.3322
as the transmitted power PS increases.
B. Asymptotic Analysis for Selections with Continuous Jamming
We use the same method as in the previous analysis for the non-jamming selections to
analyze the asymptotic performance of the proposed jamming schemes. As the transmitted
power PS increases to a relatively high value, it yields
lim
PS→∞
Γi =
L|hSj ,R|2|hR,Si|2
|hJ1,R|2|hR,Si |2 + |hS1,R|2|hJ2,Si|2 + |hS2,R|2|hJ2,Si|2
, (47)
lim
PS→∞
ΓEi =
|hSi,E|2
|hSj ,E|2
+
|hSi,R|2
|hSj ,R|2
. (48)
It is clear that both Γi and ΓEi are independent of PS, which means that for high PS ,
the ergodic secrecy rate E [RS] stops increasing and converges to a fixed value. Consider
the asymptotic performance of the OS scheme that grows linearly with the increment of PS
as described by (46), it is safe to predict that there will be a crossover point, P ′, between
the ergodic secrecy rate v.s. transmitted power curve with jamming and the one with non-
jamming. In a power range below P ′, the jamming scheme outperforms the non-jamming
one, while above this point, the jamming scheme loses its advantage in providing higher
ergodic secrecy capacity.
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We note that the analysis above can apply to any scheme with continuous jamming (i.e., OS-
MSISR, OS-MMISR, SS-MSISR, and SS-MMISR), which indicates that they share the same
asymptotic behavior as the PS increases. In another word, the proposed selection techniques
(except for OSW and SSW) behave better than the non-jamming schemes only within a
certain transmitted power range. Fortunately, in a practical case, PS is always limited in a
relatively low range and will not increase infinitely.
C. Secrecy Performance with Sparsely Distributed Intermediate Nodes
This is a common configuration in which the the eavesdropper E has similar distance with
two sources S1 and S2 and the intermediate nodes spread randomly within the considered area.
With a relatively far distance in between, the interference link between J1 and R becomes
weak. As predicted in the previous subsection, within a certain transmitted power range (less
than the crossover point P ′), the selection approaches with continuous jamming are able to
provide a higher ergodic secrecy rate than the non-jamming schemes. This gain proves the
introduction of jamming in selection schemes as an effective technique. Outside this range,
the secrecy rates of the conventional non-jamming schemes continue to grow with a slope
of 0.3322 as verified by (46), whereas those of the continuous jamming schemes converge
to a fixed value. Inside this scope, the jamming schemes lose their efficiency in providing a
better secrecy performance for the system.
We note that in some particular scenarios, the system’s integrated secrecy performance is
not measured by the sum of the total secrecy rates, but by the minimum secrecy capacity
of all the source nodes in the system. In this situation, OS-MMISR and SS-MMISR can
optimize the overall secrecy performance of the whole system. For the hybrid schemes,
the OSW and SSW schemes are able to provide better secrecy performance in the whole
transmitted power scope, since it overcomes the bottleneck caused by negative interference
on the relay-destination links.
D. Secrecy Performance With a Close Cluster of the Intermediate Nodes
Under the condition that all the intermediate nodes are located very close to each other,
we note that the continuous jamming selections will lose its efficiency in meeting the secrecy
constraints. Specifically, we will discuss two extreme situations in which the intermediate
nodes cluster is near to one of the destination nodes Si, and to the eavesdropper E, respec-
tively.
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1) The intermediate nodes cluster locates near to one of the destinations: There are
two reasons that make the proposed jamming schemes inefficient. Firstly, the nodes of the
relay/jammer cluster gather too close to each other, such that the selected jammer in the first
phase J1 has too much negative impact on the selected relay R, which further decreases the
SINRs in the second phase. Secondly, the jamming code from J2 in the second phase also
has an overly-strong interference on the destination to the one it stays close with.
2) The intermediate nodes cluster locates near to the eavesdropper: Aside from the first
reason presented above, in this configuration, the direct link between the relay R and the
eavesdropper E gets too strong, which will seriously sabotage the secrecy performance of
selection with continuous jamming.
On the other hand, the hybrid protocols (OSW and SSW) will still be the most effective
schemes in this configuration, since the system’s secrecy performance considered here is
measured by the ergodic secrecy rate.
E. Secrecy Performance With the Eavesdropper Near to One of the Source Nodes
This is the situation in which the eavesdropper E can get the communicating information
most easily, since the direct link between E and any one of the source nodes is strong, which
makes the introduction of jamming very necessary. The jamming schemes should be efficient
within quite a large power range, and the hybrid schemes should still perform as the best
selection techniques within the whole power scope.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we will provide computer simulations in order to validate the analysis in the
previous section. The simulation environment takes into account two sources S1 and S2, one
eavesdropper E, and a intermediate node cluster consisting of K = 8 nodes. All the nodes
are located in a 2D square topology within a 1 × 1 unit square. For simplicity, the source
nodes and the relay transmit with the same power, i.e. PS = PR. The relay and jammer nodes
transmit with a relay-jammer power ratio L = 10. As assumed in Section II, the power of
the AWGN is σ2 = 1. The path-loss exponent is set to β = 3. In this paper, the adopted
performance metric is the ergodic secrecy rate. Meanwhile some results are also provided in
terms of secrecy outage probability P [RS (R∗, J∗1 , J∗2 ) < RT ], where P [·] denotes probability,
and RT is the target secrecy rate.
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Fig. 2. The 1× 1 simulation environment with K = 8, β = 3.
In the first simulation, we assume a scenario where S1, S2 and E are located at (XE, YE) =
(0.5, 0), (XS1 , YS1) = (0, 1) and (XS2, YS2) = (1, 1), respectively. The intermediate nodes
spread randomly within the square space, as shown in Fig. 2.
Fig. 3 shows the ergodic secrecy rate versus the transmitted power PS = PR of different
selection schemes. We can observe that selection algorithms with jamming outperform their
non-jamming counterparts within a certain transmitted power range (less than P ′ ≈ 16dB),
where the ergodic secrecy rate of the OS-MSISR scheme is approximately higher than that of
the OS scheme by 1 bit per channel use (BPCU). Outside this range (P > P ′), the secrecy rate
of OS-MSISR converges to a power-independent value which is approximately 4.1 BPCU,
whereas the ergodic secrecy rate of OS continues to grow with a slope of 0.3322 , as proved
by (46). This validates the secrecy performance analysis in Section IV. In addition, we can
see that in this relay topology, the suboptimal schemes (SS-MSISR, SS-MMISR) which are
based on average channel knowledge perform almost the same as the optimal schemes (OS-
MSISR, OS-MMISR), which implies that in this configuration where the intermediate nodes
are sparsely distributed, an average channel knowledge may also provide enough information
in order to get optimal relay selection.
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Fig. 3. Ergodic secrecy rate versus transmitted power PS for different selection techniques.
In Fig. 3, a comparison between the OS-MSISR and OS-MMISR shows that the OS-
MSISR scheme has slightly higher ergodic secrecy capacity by about 0.25 BPCU than OS-
MMISR does corresponding to transmitted power PS . The same comparison result can be
observed from the SS-MSISR and SS-MMISR schemes, which matches our previous analysis.
Furthermore, it can be seen that OSW performs better than any other selection techniques
with or without continuous jamming. At a low power range where PS < P ′, the OSW scheme
performs slightly better than OS-MSISR, but much better than OS (by about 1.2 BPCU), for
the reason that in this range continuous jamming is almost always needed. After PS grows
much higher than P ′, OSW outperforms both the other two schemes by a large scale. For the
suboptimal case, we can see that SSW provides almost the same performance as the OSW
scheme in this relay topology, which validates the practical value of this hybrid scheme.
An observation of the performance of OSKJ scheme shows that it outperforms all the other
selection techniques, providing the highest ergodic secrecy rate when the transmitted power
increases due to its ability of the destinations to decode the artificial interference in this
OSKJ scheme.
Within this configuration, we also compare the performance of different selection tech-
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Fig. 4. Secrecy outage probability versus transmitted power PS for different selection techniques with RT = 0.2 BPCU.
niques measured by secrecy outage probability, which is shown in Fig. 4. The target secrecy
rate RS is set as 0.2 BPCU. It can be seen that selection schemes with jamming provies lower
secrecy outage probability within a certain transmitted power range (PS < P ′, P ′ ≈ 20dB).
Outside this range, the conventional selection without jamming achieves better secrecy outage
probability. Regarding the hybrid protocols, the OSW scheme outperforms the non-switching
selection techniques.
In Fig. 5, it deals with a configuration where the intermediate nodes cluster, which also
includes K = 8 nodes, is located closely near to one of the two users (e.g., node S1, without
loss of generality). We can see the ergodic secrecy rate of the proposed selection schemes
in this topology differs greatly from that in the previous configuration. We observe that
continuous jamming schemes (i.e. OS-MSISR, OS-MMISR, SS-MSISR, and SS-MMISR)
are inefficient here, which converge to less than 0.5 BPCU, validating our discussion in
Section IV.
On the other hand, OSW and SSW still outperform all the other selection techniques by
a quite large scale (more than 4 BPCU when PS is very high, as shown in Fig. 5. We
also note that in this topology, the OSW and SSW schemes perform even better than the
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Fig. 5. Ergodic secrecy rate for a scenario where the intermediate nodes are close to S1.
OSKJ scheme, which seems to be an interesting result. Further investigation reveals that the
involvement of J1 node in OSKJ causes a different value of α with that of OSW and SSW,
which results in lower secrecy rates in OSKJ than in OSW and SSW schemes. This indicates
that the proposed OSW/SSW schemes may perform even better than the “ideal” case where
the destinations can mitigate the artificial interference. All of these validate the value of the
selection techniques with intelligent switching in potential practical use.
In Fig. 6, we set the intermediate nodes cluster closely to the eavesdropper E. Here the
jamming schemes also perform worse than non-jamming ones in most of the transmitted
power range. It also shows the range where continuous jamming schemes perform better
than non-jamming schemes in this topology is slightly larger than that of the previous one,
since there is no strong R→ E link here. Regarding to the hybrid schemes, OSW and SSW
still perform as the best selection techniques in providing the highest secrecy rate.
Finally, we place the eavesdropper E near to one of the two sources (taken S1 for example)
to examine the results. The location of eavesdropper E is set to (XE, YE) = (0, 0.5), the
intermediate nodes are spread randomly across the considered rectangle area, as shown in
the inset of Fig. 7. We get a similar simulation result with that of the first configuration,
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Fig. 6. Ergodic secrecy rate for a scenario where the intermediate nodes are close to the eavesdropper E.
in which the eavesdropper E has the same distance with S1 and S2. The non-jamming
schemes (CS, OS and SS) here are less effective in promoting the secrecy performance. On
the contrary, the selection techniques with continuous jamming (OS-MSISR, OS-MMISR,
SS-MSISR and SS-MMISR) provide much higher secrecy capacity in a large transmitted
power range (P ′ ≈ 13dB). Within this power range, the hybrid schemes (OSW and SSW)
perform slightly better than the continuous jamming techniques because jamming is almost
always needed in this configuration. Outside this regime, where the non-jamming scheme
performs better, the difference between the intelligent switching and continuous jamming
increases and the hybrid schemes still perform as the most efficient schemes.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has studied the joint relay and jammer selection in two-way cooperative net-
works with physical layer secrecy consideration. The proposed scheme achieves an oppor-
tunistic selection of one conventional relay node and one (or two) jamming nodes to increase
security against eavesdroppers based on both instantaneous and average knowledge of the
eavesdropper channels. The selected relay node helps enhance the information transmission
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Fig. 7. Ergodic secrecy rate for a scenario where the eavesdropper E is close to S1.
between the two sources via an AF strategy, while the jamming nodes are used to produce
intentional interference at the eavesdropper nodes in different transmission phases. We found
that the proposed jamming schemes (i.e. OS-MSISR, OS-MMISR, SS-MSISR, and SS-
MMISR) are effective within a certain transmitted power range for scenarios with sparsely
distributed intermediate nodes. Meanwhile the non-jamming schemes (CS, OS, and SS) are
preferred in configurations where the intermediate nodes are confined close to each other. The
OSW scheme which switches intelligently between jamming and non-jamming modes is very
efficient in providing the highest secrecy rate in almost the whole transmitted power regime
in two-way cooperative networks, but it requires an instantaneous eavesdropper channel
knowledge. On the other hand, the suboptimal switching scheme, SSW, which is based on
the average knowledge of the eavesdropper channel and therefore much practical, provides
a comparable secrecy performance with the OSW scheme.
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